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Abstract 
 Previous theorizing and research has linked exposure to counter-stereotypical 
diversity (e.g., an Oxford-educated bricklayer) to enhanced cognitive performance and 
creativity. However, it is unclear whether people’s motivation to cognitively engage 
with the counter-stereotypical information (i.e., need for cognition, NFC) influences 
this effect. Across three experiments (N = 887) we found consistent support for the 
idea that exposure to counter-stereotypes (CSTs) promotes cognitive reflection for 
people low in NFC (d+ = .34). In contrast, people high in NFC showed decreased 
cognitive reflection after being exposed to CSTs (d+ = -.18), although the evidence for 
the latter effect was weak. These findings suggest that exposure to CSTs can promote 
cognitive reflection unless people have a strong desire to understand and predict 
outcomes and events, in which case exposure to CSTs may backfire. Taken together, 
we conclude that motivation to engage in cognitive activity may be an important 
consideration for research and interventions involving expectancy-violating diversity 
experiences.  
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Introduction 
 When the music legend Prince passed away, the New York Times honored him 
by writing that he “defied narrow stereotypes about race and gender” and thus “opened 
the minds of others” (The New York Times, 2016). Indeed, it is notable that 
contemporary societies increasingly bring people into contact with complex 
combinations of social, religious, and cultural identities (e.g., a female CEO, a Muslim 
hipster, a gay Catholic, a Harvard-educated carpenter). Such identities do not conform 
to traditional stereotypes and thus are termed “counter-stereotypes” (abbreviated as 
“CSTs”). CSTs are becoming commonplace in many spheres of our lives. When we 
travel, change jobs, or move to new places, we inevitably meet people who challenge 
our preconceptions. The media, films, and books frequently feature significant 
achievements of underrepresented minorities, such as the film Hidden Figures that tells 
the story of three Black female engineers who helped send US American rockets into 
space. What is more, grassroots social media campaigns have been launched in recent 
years with the goal to dismantle clichés, for example the #ILookLikeAnEngineer 
campaign started by a female engineer on Twitter. The question then, is how do people 
respond to new forms of social and cultural diversity? And to what extent can exposure 
to social and cultural diversity affect broader cognitive functioning? 
The CPAG model 
 Crisp and Turner's (2011) Categorization-Processing-Adaptation-
Generalization (CPAG) Model suggests that people try to make sense of CSTs by 
engaging in “inconsistency resolution” (Hutter & Crisp, 2005). For example, someone 
who meets an individual that challenges their stereotypes may wonder: “Why is this 
Muslim a hipster?”, “How did this woman achieve the rank of a CEO?”, or “What 
made this Harvard-educated man become a carpenter?” By seeking answers to these 
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questions, judgments are less likely to be based on existing stereotypes and more likely 
on impressions of individuals. According to the CPAG model, at least two conditions 
are necessary for people to try to resolve apparent inconsistencies: The perceiver needs 
to 1) be motivated to resolve the inconsistency, and 2) have sufficient cognitive 
resources to do so (see also Fazio, 1990). If these conditions are met, then the perceiver 
will seek to resolve the inconsistency by suppressing their existing stereotypical 
knowledge and re-construing the target with individualized attributes (e.g., by thinking 
about the Harvard-educated carpenter as “non-conformist”). Crucially, Crisp and 
Turner (2011) predict that the process of resolving inconsistencies will stimulate 
greater cognitive flexibility in the short term, and if repeated over time, in the long-
term as well. In this area of research, cognitive flexibility is typically defined as the 
“(…) capacity to ‘break set’, go beyond the established and mentally accessible ways 
of thinking in favor of thinking differently from other people or differently from what 
is habitual” (e.g., Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013, p. 218). 
There is some support for the CPAG model. For example, Gocłowska, Crisp, 
and Labuschagne (2012) found that thinking of a gender CST (e.g., a female mechanic) 
boosted creative performance within a short experimental session. In another line of 
research, Prati, Vasiljevic, Crisp, and Rubini (2015) showed that thinking of CSTs 
pertaining to gender (e.g., a female mechanic) decreased dehumanization (i.e., the 
tendency to consider others as less human than ourselves). Importantly, this change 
was mediated by a reduced reliance on heuristic thinking, lending support to the 
model. Finally, research indicates that exposure to CSTs reduces intergroup bias by 
evoking surprise (Prati, Crisp, & Rubini, 2015), suggesting that affective-motivational 
states may play a role in the process of resolving inconsistencies following exposure to 
CSTs. However, the premise that perceivers need to be motivated to engage in 
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cognitive activity1 in order for CSTs to promote cognitive performance has not been 
tested to date. More precisely, some initial work suggests that personal need for 
structure (PNS, i.e., preferences for the desired outcome of cognitive activity) 
moderates the effects of exposure to CSTs on cognitive flexibility (e.g., Gocłowska, 
Baas, Crisp, & De Dreu, 2014). In this research, individuals low (vs. high) in PNS 
showed improved (vs. decreased) cognitive flexibility after exposure to CSTs. 
However, it is currently unknown whether need for cognition (i.e., preferences for the 
desired amount of cognitive activity) moderates this effect. Need for cognition (or 
NFC), also known as epistemic / intellectual curiosity (Mussel, 2010), can be seen as 
an individual difference variable reflecting the extent to which people desire to 
understand and predict outcomes or events. This desire manifests itself as “an 
individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity” (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and it seems likely that contexts that challenge 
traditional stereotypes pose a challenge to people’s ability to understand and predict 
outcomes and events.  
In the present work, we investigated a close relative of cognitive flexibility––
cognitive reflection––which is defined as “the ability or disposition to resist reporting 
the response that first comes to mind” (Frederick, 2005, p. 36). Given that the CPAG 
model postulates inconsistency resolution to be the critical process that is triggered 
when people are exposed to CSTs (and after certain necessary conditions are met), it 
was important to investigate whether individual differences in the desired amount 
(rather than outcome) of cognitive activity play a moderating role in the effect on 
cognitive reflection. More precisely, because inconsistency resolution itself is a 
process rather than outcome, it seems likely that people’s desire to think about CSTs 
                                                        
1Here we define cognitive activity as information processing that enables inconsistency resolution. 
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(i.e., individual differences in NFC) may play a more important role in exposure to 
CSTs than their desire for certain cognitive outcomes (i.e., individual differences in 
PNS). The present paper aimed to test this prediction of the CPAG model, that is, the 
role of individual differences in NFC in the experience of counter-stereotypical 
diversity. 
How might need for cognition moderate the effect of exposure to CSTs on 
cognitive reflection? 
 There are two plausible––but competing––predictions of how exposure to 
CSTs might affect intellectually more versus less curious people. First, people high in 
NFC may be more likely to show cognitive flexibility in response to CSTs because 
they are more motivated to resolve the inconsistencies than people low in NFC, which 
might make them more likely to expend resources in the face of expectancy-violating 
experiences (Gocłowska, Damian, & Mor, 2017; Leung & Chiu, 2008). In turn, this 
could mean that people high in NFC form more cross-cutting explanations for the 
inconsistent social categories, which may activate more distal cognitive associations 
and networks (Greenwald et al., 2002) and ultimately enhance cognitive reflection. In 
other words, people high in NFC should be more willing to resolve the inconsistencies 
than people low in NFC and consequently, they should be more likely to switch from a 
heuristic, category-based mode of processing to a systematic, individuating mode 
(Evans, 2008; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). In contrast, people low in NFC are by definition less intellectually curious and 
thus less likely to be motivated to cognitively resolve CSTs. As a result, they are likely 
to remain in the heuristic processing mode, both when being exposed to CSTs, and in 
subsequent cognitively challenging tasks. Taken together, one can predict that 
exposure to CSTs makes people high in NFC switch from heuristic to systematic 
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processing (thus boosting cognitive reflection), whereas exposure to CSTs may not 
affect people low in NFC. 
 Alternatively, exposure to CSTs, due to being surprising and unexpected (Prati, 
Crisp, & Rubini, 2015), may spark interest and curiosity in individuals low in NFC, 
which in turn increases their levels of cognitive reflection. In other words, exposure to 
CSTs may motivate individuals low in NFC (rather than those high in NFC) to seek to 
resolve the stereotypical inconsistencies, which in turn might make these individuals 
switch from a heuristic, category-based mode of processing to a systematic, 
individuating mode. This idea is consistent with the findings of Allen, Sherman, 
Conrey, and Stroessner (2009) who found that when people have low processing 
capacity and stereotypes are strong (e.g., a violent Black person, a warm and friendly 
woman), then they pay more attention to information that is inconsistent with their pre-
existing stereotypes than information which is consistent. In contrast, people high in 
NFC (who already engage in relatively systematic modes of processing by default) 
might not be sufficiently surprised by CSTs and thus not engage in more cognitive 
reflection than they already engage in (i.e., a ceiling effect).  
The Present Research 
 The present research involved three experiments that tested the competing 
predictions described above by exposing participants to different CSTs and 
subsequently measuring their cognitive reflection. As such, this research was 
exploratory rather than confirmatory in nature. We developed and validated two 
paradigms to solicit CST experiences and measured cognitive reflection using the 7-
item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). 
NFC was measured using the 18-item NFC scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). 
Sample sizes and participant inclusion criteria were specified a-priori and we report all 
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measures, manipulations, and exclusions. The data sets of all three experiments and the 
R code used to run all analyses can be found on the Open Science Framework 
(https://goo.gl/CnYmsf). 
Experiment 1 
Pre-test 
 To manipulate exposure to CSTs, participants were asked to read a short 
paragraph, which described a CEO (Chief Executive Officer) named David. 
Participants in the control condition were asked to imagine that they read the following 
paragraph on the Internet: “David is a CEO. He’s also a college graduate (Harvard), 
born and raised in the US, and happily married to his wife Linda”. Participants in the 
experimental condition were asked to imagine that they read a slightly different 
paragraph about David: “David is a CEO. He’s also a college dropout (Harvard), a 
Mexican immigrant, and happily married to his husband Michael.” We established that 
the description of David was counter-stereotypical by recruiting 41 US American 
participants (16 female; Mage = 31.51, SDage = 11.53) through the crowdsourcing 
platform Prolific (www.prolific.ac; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017) and 
randomly assigning them to the two conditions described above.  
After reading the paragraph about David, participants were asked “To what 
extent do you feel surprised?” and “To what extent do you feel astonished?” on a scale 
from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Very much). Next, to reinforce the manipulation, 
participants were instructed to imagine what David and his life are like and to describe 
(in as much detail as possible) their thoughts as to what characteristics he might 
possess. We checked that this manipulation was successful by asking participants to 
indicate their agreement with four statements: “David is a typical CEO” (reverse-
coded), “Reading about David challenged some of my beliefs”, “There isn’t anything 
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puzzling about David’s life” (reverse-coded), and “Imagining David’s life made me 
think ‘outside the box’”, again on a scale from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 100 (Strongly 
agree). The manipulation check was followed by an attention check because it is often 
difficult to ascertain whether or not participants pay attention to the study materials 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), see Appendix A. We created a measure 
of counter-stereotypicality by calculating the mean of six items (i.e., the two items 
reflecting surprise and the four items reflecting counter-stereotypicality, α = .80). 
Lastly, participants were asked to indicate their sex, nationality, ethnicity, and English 
speaking ability, before being thanked and debriefed.  
As expected, participants in the experimental condition perceived David as 
significantly more counter-stereotypical (M = 48.09, SD = 16.67) than participants in 
the control condition (M = 16.24, SD = 9.95), with t(29) = -7.20, p < .0012, Cohen’s d 
= 2.34. These findings confirm the adequacy of the manipulation.  
Method 
Participants 
 Following previous findings exploring PNS as a moderator of the effect of 
CSTs on cognitive reflection (Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013), we reasoned that the 
moderating effect of NFC on the same relation would be medium-sized (d = .50). 
Power analysis, conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007), with an alpha of .05 suggested that N = 210 participants would provide 95% 
power to detect an effect of this magnitude. We recruited 397 participants via social 
media (www.reddit.com) and the crowdsourcing platform Prolific to take part in an 
online experiment on “imagination and problem solving”. Participants either 
volunteered their time or were compensated with GB£1.30 / US$1.80. We determined 
                                                        
2All p-values in this paper are two-tailed. 
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participant inclusion criteria a-priori (see Appendix A) and N = 315 participants (177 
male, 134 female, 3 other, 1 prefer not to say; Mage = 29.87, SDage = 10.57; 86% US 
American nationality, 14% other) were included in the analyses.  
Procedure and materials 
 The experiment comprised three parts and participants completed all tasks 
online using the survey software Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Part 1 was identical 
to the pre-test in that participants were randomly assigned to imagine a stereotypical or 
a counter-stereotypical CEO named David. We recorded the amount of time that 
participants spent on this task and also asked them to rate their surprise and 
astonishment. Next, to reinforce the manipulation, participants were instructed to 
imagine what David and his life could be like and to describe what characteristics he 
might possess.  
 In part 2, we measured participants’ cognitive reflection using the 7-item 
version of the CRT (Toplak et al., 2013). The items are designed such that an incorrect 
solution to each of the seven questions initially comes to mind. Cognitive reflection is 
demonstrated when the incorrect response is overridden and, upon further reflection, 
the correct solution is determined. For example, one item states that “Jerry received 
both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in 
the class?” The intuitive, but incorrect, answer is “30”; while the correct answer is 
“29”. Participants were presented with seven such problems in a counter-balanced 
order and were given up to two minutes to solve each problem. They were 
automatically redirected to the next page when the time was up. If they solved the 
problem in less than two minutes, then they were allowed to proceed. The problem-
solving task was followed by the manipulation check and attention check, which were 
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identical to the pre-test. The manipulation check items had good internal consistency 
(α = .82).  
 In part 3 of the experiment, participants were first asked how vividly they 
imagined the CST individual (i.e., David) and his life, and several questions about their 
motivation to engage in the imagination task and CRT, how easy / difficult they found 
doing so, their feelings about David and his life, as well as the extent to which they are 
prone to experience awe (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007); see Appendix A for all 
items used. Participants were then asked to indicate whether they were suspicious at 
any point that the researchers were investigating something other than what was stated, 
and if so, they were asked to describe what they thought the real purpose of the study 
was. Next, participants indicated their age, sex, sexual orientation, nationality, 
ethnicity, English speaking ability, and their average marks in core high school 
subjects (namely, English, Mathematics, Social Sciences, Science). Finally, 
participants completed the 10-item version of the Big Five inventory (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), the 10-item curiosity and exploration inventory (Kashdan 
et al., 2009), and the 18-item NFC scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). Upon completing 
these questionnaires, participants were thanked and debriefed.3  
Analytic approach 
 The data were analyzed using moderated regression analyses with the pequod 
package in the programming language R (Mirisola & Seta, 2016). Conditions were 
contrast coded as −1 (control) and +1 (experimental) and we computed a mean score 
reflecting NFC by averaging the 18 items (reverse-coded where appropriate, α = .95).  
                                                        
3 We included the measures of vividness, motivation and ability to engage with experimental materials, 
feelings about David and his life, awe-proneness, sex, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, nationality, 
English speaking ability, average marks in core high school subjects, the Big 5, and of trait curiosity 
purely for exploratory purposes––they were not central to our hypotheses and are not further analyzed. 
However, Appendix D reports the results of statistical analyses examining the moderating role of the Big 
Five personality traits, trait curiosity, and sex.  
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check 
 To check the adequacy of the CST manipulation, we regressed the mean CST 
score (i.e., the index of the manipulation check items) on condition, NFC, and their 
interaction. The predictor variables were centered prior to computing the interaction 
term. As expected, there was a main effect of condition (b = 12.11, t(310) = 12.12, p < 
.001), such that participants in the experimental condition perceived David as more 
counter-stereotypical than participants in the control condition. The effect of NFC (b = 
-.65, t(310) = -.94, p = .35) and the interaction term were not statistically significant (b 
= .41, t(310) = .60, p = .55). Thus, our manipulation of counter-stereotypicality was 
successful, regardless of participants’ level of NFC.  
Randomization check 
Prior to exploring whether NFC moderates the effect of exposure to CSTs on 
cognitive reflection we checked whether NFC differed across conditions. This is 
because we had measured NFC as part of the same experimental session and, although 
unlikely4, participants’ responses to the measure of NFC may have been affected by 
the experimental manipulation. A Welch Two Sample t-test revealed that NFC did not 
significantly differ across conditions, t(312) = .08, p = .93, Cohen’s d = .009, 
suggesting that the manipulation did not affect NFC scores.  
The effects of condition, NFC, and their interaction on cognitive reflection 
 To explore the role of NFC, we repeated the above analysis, but this time 
regressed the number of correctly solved CRT-items on condition, NFC, and their 
interaction. The analyses revealed no main effect of condition (b = .01, t(311) = 0.11, p 
                                                        
4 It is unlikely that the experimental manipulation affected responses to the NFC scale because the latter 
is a trait measure. Furthermore, to minimize the possibility that the experimental condition affected 
responses to the NFC scale, we temporally separated the main part of the experiment from the 
questionnaires designed to measure individual differences etc. by instructing participants to first answer 
the demographic questions.   
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= .92), but a statistically significant main effect of NFC (b = .39, t(311) = 4.81, p < 
.001), such that participants high in NFC consistently outperformed participants low in 
NFC on the cognitive reflection task. This is not surprising, as previous research has 
demonstrated that NFC predicts cognitive performance (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  
 The main effect of NFC was, however, qualified by a marginally significant 
two-way interaction between condition and NFC (b = -.15, t(311) = -1.87, p = .06). To 
understand the nature of the interaction, we inspected the effect of condition 
(experimental vs. control) on cognitive reflection at different levels of NFC using 
simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). We defined “low NFC” as 1SD below 
the mean and “high NFC” as 1SD above the mean. As Figure 1 illustrates, our analysis 
revealed two trends: a trend towards a positive effect of condition on cognitive 
reflection among people low in NFC (b = 0.24, t(311) = 1.40, p = .16) and a trend 
toward a negative effect of condition on cognitive reflection among people high in 
NFC (b = -0.21, t(311) = -1.24, p = .21).  
Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 1 provide preliminary evidence in support of the 
second prediction outlined in the introduction; namely that exposure to CSTs may 
benefit people low but not high in NFC. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the 
preliminary findings of Experiment 1 with an alternative manipulation of exposure to 
CSTs.  
Experiment 2 
Pre-test 
 As before, participants were asked to read a paragraph, but this time describing 
a person named Mary. Participants in the control condition were asked to imagine that 
they read the following paragraph on the Internet: “Mary is a secondary school teacher 
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(married, two children), a university graduate (English literature), and UK native. 
Mary has a positive outlook on life.” Participants in the experimental condition were 
asked to imagine reading the following paragraph instead: “Mary is a political leader 
(remarried, two children), a scientist (quantum physics), and a Polish immigrant. Mary 
has a positive outlook on life.” A pre-test was used to establish the extent to which 
these new stimulus materials were deemed to run counter to conventional stereotypes. 
Specifically, 51 British participants (25 female; Mage = 34.06, SDage = 10.15) were 
recruited via the crowdsourcing platform Prolific and randomly assigned to imagine 
Mary as a (stereotypical) female teacher or Mary as a (counter-stereotypical) female 
political leader. After reading the paragraph about Mary, participants were asked how 
surprised and astonished they felt and were instructed to imagine what Mary and her 
life could be like. Following this task, participants indicated their agreement with four 
statements: “Mary is a typical woman” (reverse-coded), “Reading about Mary 
challenged some of my beliefs”, “There isn’t anything puzzling about Mary’s life” 
(reverse-coded), and “Imagining Mary’s life made me think ‘outside the box’”, all on a 
scale from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 100 (Strongly agree). We created a composite 
measure of counter-stereotypicality by calculating the mean of the six items, i.e., the 
items measuring surprise and astonishment and the four items measuring counter-
stereotypicality. The internal consistency of these items was acceptable (α = .69). 
Lastly, participants were asked to indicate their sex, age, nationality, ethnicity, and 
English speaking ability, before being thanked and debriefed.  
In support of the adequacy of the manipulation, participants in the experimental 
condition perceived Mary as significantly more counter-stereotypical (M = 37.29, SD = 
17.35) than participants in the control condition (M = 26.47, SD = 10.14), t(40) = -
2.73, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .76.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Based on the calculation of statistical power used in Experiment 1, we again 
aimed to recruit a minimum of 210 participants to Experiment 2. We recruited 616 
participants via a university mailing list at a UK university to take part in an online 
experiment on “imagination and problem solving”. All participants who completed the 
experiment were entered into a prize draw to win one of two GB£50.00 shopping 
vouchers or one of five GB£20.00 shopping vouchers. The attention check and 
participant inclusion criteria were identical to Experiment 1. The final sample 
consisted of 302 participants (90 male, 206 female, 3 other, 3 prefer not to say; Mage = 
24.21, SDage = 8.12; 81% British nationality, 19% other nationality).5  
Procedure and materials 
 The procedure and materials were identical to Experiment 1 except for the new 
manipulation (i.e., Mary the female teacher vs. political leader, rather than David the 
CEO) and the addition of the brief mood introspection scale (Mayer & Gaschke, 
1988)6 after the attention check. The manipulation check items had acceptable internal 
consistency (α = .69) and all instructions are reported verbatim in Appendix B. 
                                                        
5 Experiment 2 was different from Experiment 1 because we distributed a Qualtrics link via an email 
server to all students and employees at a large UK University, inviting them to take part in our online 
experiment. As a result, the experiment was not as constrained as it normally would be in a laboratory 
setting or on an online platform like Prolific, where you can set a maximum allowed time to complete a 
study. Thus, because participation in Experiment 2 was completely voluntary and done remotely, many 
participants did not have an incentive to finish it or read the instructions carefully. As a result, N = 151 
participants took longer than 30 minutes to complete the study and N = 163 participants did not pass our 
attention check.  
6 We also included a measure of mood (namely, the brief mood introspection scale; Mayer & Gaschke, 
1988) in Experiment 2 because both positive and negative moods have previously been linked to 
enhanced cognitive and creative performance (Baas, Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Cheng, Leung, & Wu, 
2011; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Including the brief mood introspection scale allowed us to 
investigate whether the effect of exposure to CSTs on cognitive performance holds when controlling for 
different mood states, and thus to rule out mood as a potential explanation for the effect. To examine 
whether exposure to CSTs altered mood states related to cognitive reflection, we computed variables 
representing positive activating moods (7-point Likert-type scale; lively, happy, peppy, loving, caring, 
and active; α = .74), negative activating moods (jittery, nervous, fed up, gloomy, grouchy, and sad; α = 
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Results and discussion 
Manipulation check 
To check the adequacy of the manipulation of CSTs, we used multiple 
regression to examine the effect of condition on the mean CST score. We entered 
condition, NFC, and their interaction term as predictor variables and the mean CST 
score at the dependent variable. This produced a highly statistically significant main 
effect of condition (b = 6.10, t(283) = 7.53, p < .001), such that participants in the 
experimental condition viewed Mary as more counter-stereotypical than participants in 
the control condition. There was no statistically significant effect of NFC on the mean 
CST score (b = .38, t(283) = .47, p = .64), but there was a marginally statistically 
significant interaction between NFC and condition on the mean CST score (b = -1.44, 
t(283) = -1.82, p = .07). We interpret these results as suggesting that our CST 
manipulation was successful because of the highly significant main effect of condition 
on the CST score.  
Randomization check 
A Welch Two Sample t-test revealed that NFC did not significantly differ 
between the conditions (t(277) = -.87, p = .38, Cohen’s d = .10) suggesting that the 
randomization to the experimental vs. control condition was successful.  
The effects of condition, NFC, and their interaction on cognitive reflection  
 To examine the role of NFC, we regressed the number of correctly solved 
CRT-items on condition, NFC, and their interaction. The analyses revealed a trend for 
the experimental condition to influence CRT-performance (b = .20, t(284) = 1.68, p = 
.09) such that participants in the experimental condition outperformed participants in 
the control condition. There was also a highly significant main effect of NFC on CRT 
                                                                                                                                                                
.80), positive deactivating moods (content and calm; α = .52), and negative deactivating moods (tired 
and drowsy; α =.66). 
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performance (b = .47, t(284) = 3.99, p < .001) such that participants high in NFC 
outperformed participants low in NFC. The main effects were, however, qualified by a 
statistically significant two-way interaction between condition and NFC (b = -.25, 
t(284) = -2.10, p = .04). As Figure 2 illustrates, simple slopes analyses revealed a 
positive effect of the experimental condition on performance for participants low in 
NFC (b = 0.46, t(284) = 2.67, p = .008), but no effect of the experimental condition on 
performance for participants high in NFC (b = -0.05, t(284) = -0.30, p = .76).7,8 
Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 2 support those of Experiment 1 and provide 
further evidence in support of the second prediction outlined in the introduction which 
is that exposure to CSTs benefits people low, but not high in NFC. However, one 
limitation with Experiments 1 and 2 is that we manipulated counter-stereotypicality 
and measured cognitive reflection and NFC in the same experimental session. 
Although our randomization checks showed that NFC did not differ across conditions, 
Experiment 3 aimed to provide a more rigorous test of the competing predictions by 
separating the measure of NFC from the experimental manipulation by a week. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants 
                                                        
7 Adding the mood variables as covariates to the regression model yielded a more clear-cut pattern of 
results. Again, there was a trend for experimental condition to influence CRT-performance (b = .20, 
t(274) = 1.68, p = .10) and there was a highly statistically significant main effect of NFC (b = .48, t(274) 
= 3.98, p <.001). The two-way interaction between condition and NFC also remained statistically 
significant (b = -.28, t(274) = -2.29, p = .02). Simple slopes analyses revealed a positive effect of the 
experimental condition on the performance of participants low in NFC (b = 0.49, t(274) = 2.79, p = 
.006), but no effect of the experimental condition on the performance of participants high in NFC (b = -
0.08, t(274) = -0.45, p = .65). 
8 To illustrate what happens when less restrictive participant inclusion criteria are applied, we re-ran the 
analyses with 35 (instead of 30) minutes as an inclusion criterion. Doing so meant that the sample size 
increased from 302 to 328 participants. The interaction effect between condition and NFC became 
marginally significant (b = -.19, t(310) = -1.68, p = .09). As with the more restrictive inclusion criterion 
(i.e., 30 minutes), simple slopes analyses revealed a positive effect of the experimental condition on 
performance for participants low in NFC (b = 0.37, t(310) = 2.25, p = .025), but no effect of the 
experimental condition on performance for participants high in NFC (b = -0.02, t(310) = -0.14, p = .89). 
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 As in Experiments 1 and 2 we aimed to recruit a minimum of 210 participants. 
We recruited 344 participants via Prolific to take part in an online experiment on 
“imagination and problem solving” in return for GB£1.60. The attention check and 
participant inclusion criteria were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Our final sample 
consisted of 270 participants (96 male, 171 female, 2 other, 1 prefer not to say; Mage = 
31.59, SDage = 10.77; 99% British, 1% other).  
Procedure and materials 
 The procedure and materials were identical to Experiment 2 except for the 
following changes. In part 1 of the experiment, participants answered the questions 
designed to assess NFC, Big 5 personality traits, curiosity, dispositional differences in 
proneness to awe, and demographic characteristics (sex, age, nationality, ethnicity, 
English language ability). Part 2 was then administered one week later and involved 
the CST manipulation and CRT. Experiment 3 also incorporated two attention checks. 
The first attention check was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 and was placed in 
part 1 of the experiment. The second attention check was placed after the question “I 
was motivated to solve the 7 problems” presented in part 2 of the experiment. In 
addition, we included exploratory items measuring self-relevance of / similarity to the 
CST individual (see Appendix C). 
Results and discussion 
Manipulation check 
To check the adequacy of the CST manipulation, we again used multiple 
regression to examine the effect of condition on the mean CST score. We entered 
condition, NFC, and their interaction term as predictor variables and the mean CST 
score at the dependent variable. This produced a highly statistically significant main 
effect of condition (b = 8.35, t(256) = 8.88, p < .001), such that participants in the 
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experimental condition viewed Mary as more counter-stereotypical than participants in 
the control condition. There was no effect of NFC on the mean CST score (b = -.83, 
t(256) = -1.00, p = .32), but there was a marginally statistically significant interaction 
between NFC and condition (b = -1.50, t(256) = -1.82, p = .07). The main effect of 
condition on the CST score suggests that our CST manipulation was successful.  
The effect of condition, NFC, and their interaction on cognitive reflection 
To examine the effect of condition, NFC, and their interaction on cognitive 
reflection, we repeated the above moderated regression analysis, but this time 
regressed the number of correctly solved CRT-items on condition, NFC, and their 
interaction. We found no effect of condition on CRT performance (b = .03, t(258) = 
.19, p =.85) and a highly statistically significant main effect of NFC on CRT 
performance (b = .53, t(258) = 4.18, p < .001), such that participants high in NFC 
outperformed participants low in NFC. The main effects were qualified by a 
statistically significant interaction between NFC and condition on CRT performance (b 
= -.27, t(258) = -2.44, p = .016). As Figure 3 illustrates, simple slopes analyses 
revealed a positive effect of condition on CRT performance for participants low in 
NFC (b = .36, t(250) = 1.95, p = .064) and a trend for condition to have a negative 
effect on CRT performance for participants high in NFC (b = -.34, t(250) = -1.88, p = 
.113).9  
Discussion 
                                                        
9 Adding the four mood variables as control variables to the above regression equation resulted in a 
more clear-cut pattern of results. The main effect of condition on CRT performance remained non-
significant (b = .01, t(250) = .08, p = .94) and the effect of NFC on CRT performance (b = .53, t(250) = 
4.77, p < .001) remained highly statistically significant. Like before, the interaction effect between NFC 
and condition on CRT performance was statistically significant (b = -.30, t(250) = -2.67, p = .008). 
Simple slopes analyses revealed a positive effect of condition on CRT performance for participants low 
in NFC (b = .36, t(250) = 1.95, p = .05) and a negative effect of condition on CRT performance for 
participants high in NFC (b = -.34, t(250) = -1.88, p = .06). 
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 The findings of Experiment 3 provide further evidence in support of the second 
competing prediction (namely, that people low but not high in NFC benefit from 
exposure to CSTs). In the next two sections, we combine the insights from the three 
experiments meta-analytically in order to gain an estimate of the overall magnitude of 
the effect. 
Meta summary of effect sizes across the experiments 
Because all three experiments investigated the effect of exposure to CSTs on 
measures of cognitive reflection, we employed a random-effects meta-analysis model 
(using the metafor package in R; Viechtbauer, 2010) to estimate the average effect of 
exposure to CSTs on cognitive reflection. Specifically, we computed the sample-
weighted (main) effects of condition on cognitive reflection, respectively, across the 
sample as a whole and also the effect of condition among participants low versus high 
in NFC separately. The average effect of condition (i.e., exposure to CSTs vs. control 
condition) on cognitive reflection across the three experiments was d+ = .08, CI.95 [-
.06, .22]. The fact that the 95% CI included zero suggests that exposure to CSTs does 
not generally boost cognitive reflection (or at least not in our sample). This finding 
stands in contrast to previous research that has reported main effects of exposure to 
CSTs on cognitive performance (e.g., Gocłowska et al., 2012; Prati, Vasiljevic, et al., 
2015). Recall, however, that our primary goal was to test whether exposure to CSTs 
would change cognitive reflection depending on people’s levels of NFC. The meta-
analysis across the three experiments showed that on average, exposure to CSTs had a 
small-to-medium-sized positive effect on the cognitive reflection of participants low in 
NFC, d+ = .34, CI.95 [.15, .54], while exposure to CSTs had a small negative effect on 
the cognitive reflection of participants high in NFC, d+ = -.18, CI.95 [-.38, .02]. Note, 
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however, that the 95% confidence interval for the effect on participants high in NFC 
included zero, so the evidence for an effect among people high in NFC is weak. 
General discussion 
 Three experiments explored how exposure to CSTs affects cognitive reflection 
among participants who are low versus high in NFC. The findings revealed that 
participants low in NFC performed better on the Cognitive Reflection Test following 
exposure to CSTs than did participants low in NFC who were not exposed to CSTs. 
Across the three experiments, the average effect of exposure to CSTs among 
participants low in NFC was small to medium in magnitude (d+ = .34). Interestingly, 
exposure to CSTs also influenced the performance of participants high in NFC on the 
Cognitive Reflection Test. However, unlike participants low in NFC, the cognitive 
performance of participants high in NFC tended to decrease following exposure to 
CSTs––an effect that was, on average, small in magnitude (d+ = -.18). Taken together, 
these findings provide converging evidence that the effects of interventions based on 
exposure to CSTs depend on, or are moderated by, individual differences in NFC.  
Theoretical and practical implications 
There has been a surprising dearth of research on whether and how the effects 
of exposure to diversity on cognitive outcomes differ between individuals. By 
identifying one moderating variable––namely, NFC––and how it influences the effect 
of exposure to CSTs on cognitive reflection, the present research represents an 
important advance in understanding. Specifically, the findings of the present research 
suggest that a simple “one size fits all” explanation of how exposure to CSTs 
influences performance may be overly simplistic. Failing to consider individual 
differences in NFC in the effects of exposure to CSTs may, for example, 
unintentionally give rise to adverse consequences for people high in NFC, although the 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
22 
evidence for a negative effect among people high in NFC was weak in the present 
research. The practical implications are that both researchers and practitioners need to 
consider individual differences in NFC when designing and delivering interventions 
that involve exposing people to CSTs. 
 Recall that previous research on exposure to CSTs and PNS suggests that 
individual differences in PNS moderate the effect of exposure to CSTs on creativity. 
According to Gocłowska and Crisp (2013), people high in PNS seek to organize 
information in relatively simple ways and therefore dislike experiences that challenge 
their mental representations. In contrast, people low in PNS approach tasks in a more 
open-minded manner and are less inclined to over-generalize, which predisposes them 
to embrace inconsistencies. In line with this reasoning, Gocłowska and Crisp (2013) 
found that exposure to a CST (a female mechanic) only enhanced creative performance 
among individuals low in PNS (see also Gocłowska et al., 2014). Also recall that NFC 
and PNS are typically construed as relatively orthogonal, independent constructs (e.g., 
see Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, who reported only a weak, negative correlation 
between NFC and PNS). That is, while NFC represents preferences for the amount of 
cognitive activity, PNS represents preferences for the desired outcome of cognitive 
activity. From this perspective, our findings complement research on the moderating 
effects of PNS by suggesting that people may require both a low level of PNS, and/or 
a low level of NFC, in order to reap cognitive benefits from exposure to CSTs. 
 On a theoretical level, the present research extends previous work on how 
exposure to CSTs affects emotional, motivational, and cognitive outcomes. 
Specifically, the three experiments reported in this article suggest that exposure to 
CSTs can sometimes be remarkably powerful, which has theoretical implications for 
models specifying the psychological effects of exposure to CST diversity (Crisp & 
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Turner, 2011; Gocłowska et al., 2017). That is, it appears that high levels of motivation 
to engage in cognitive activity may not be required in order for people to engage with 
CSTs, but instead exposure to CSTs may actually have larger (and more positive) 
effects among people with relatively low levels of motivation to engage in cognitive 
activity. However, an important caveat is that too much motivation to engage in 
cognitive activity can potentially backfire.  
Limitations and future directions 
 Several psychological mechanisms may explain why NFC moderates the effect 
of exposure to CSTs on cognitive performance. On the one hand, it may be that 
exposure to CSTs triggered interest and curiosity in participants low in NFC, thus 
boosting their cognitive performance. This idea is in line with research on the emotion 
of interest, which suggests that interest is a “knowledge emotion” that motivates 
people to learn and explore (Silvia, 2008; see also von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2011). It also seems likely that people low in NFC have more “headroom”–
–that is, more potential to open up and be cognitively stimulated––than those high in 
NFC, which renders a higher capacity to become interested in the first place. With 
respect to the (small) negative effect of exposure to CSTs among people high in NFC, 
it is possible that participants high in NFC found making sense of CSTs (i.e., the 
process “inconsistency resolution”) depleting in the sense that it has been reported to 
be a resource-consuming psychological process because people need to suppress 
existing stereotypes, and then generate new impressions of expectancy-violating 
individuals (Hutter & Crisp, 2006; Macrae et al., 1999). They may therefore have had 
less capacity to engage in cognitive activity than people low in NFC who found the 
process less depleting. Future research needs to test these possible psychological 
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mechanisms to elucidate why exposure to CSTs sometimes has beneficial effects, and 
why it sometimes may backfire. 
 One limitation of the present research is that some of the conditions postulated 
by the CPAG model may not have been met, which may have resulted in a failure to 
replicate the direct effect of exposure to CSTs on performance reported in prior 
research (e.g., Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). For example, whether or not participants 
actually engaged in inconsistency resolution is unknown. Future research using similar 
counter-stereotype paradigms is advised to measure this process (e.g., by content-
coding the imagery descriptions and using text mining or linguistic analysis) in order 
to determine when or why it happens or fails to happen. More broadly, developing a 
method to analyze participants’ text responses may help reveal to what extent 
participants are engaged in the experiments, and whether different types of engagement 
may influence the findings. 
 In addition, a limitation but also strength of the reported research is that the 
experiments drew on different sources to recruit participants. While all experiments 
were conducted online, some of the participants were recruited via Prolific and Reddit, 
and others were recruited via the local university. On the one hand, it is remarkable 
that the reported patterns of results were relatively comparable across the three 
experiments and the different recruitment methods, suggesting that the findings are 
robust. On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the different 
recruitment methods influenced the reported effects because the experiments also 
differed from each other in other ways. For example, across the experiments we 
recruited participants from different countries and tested different manipulations, so it 
is unclear which of the factors influenced the strength of the effect. It is therefore 
important that in future research different participant recruitment methods (e.g., in the 
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lab vs. online)––and their potential implications for the hypothesized effects––are 
taken into consideration.  
 Finally, we recognize that the present research used a limited range of CSTs 
and only one measure of cognitive reflection. Future research needs to test whether the 
effects discovered in the present research can be replicated with different 
manipulations of CSTs and alternative measures of cognitive reflection / flexibility. 
Moreover, it will be important to explore whether the reported effects can arise in 
different contexts and cultures in order to better understand how universal and 
generalizable (vs. local and specific) they are. 
Conclusion 
 The role of people’s motivation to engage in cognitive activity (i.e., intellectual 
curiosity) in the effect of exposure to counter-stereotypical diversity on cognitive 
performance has been relatively neglected in social psychological research to date. 
Three experiments (with a total N of 887 participants) support the idea that exposure to 
CSTs has a positive effect on cognitive reflection among people low in NFC. Taken 
together, this research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the effects of 
exposure to CSTs on cognitive reflection, which in turn could help to maximize the 
gains and minimize the pains of diversity. 
  
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
26 
References 
Allen, T. J., Sherman, J. W., Conrey, F. R., & Stroessner, S. J. (2009). Stereotype 
strength and attentional bias: Preference for confirming versus disconfirming 
information depends on processing capacity. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45(5), 1081-1087. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.002 
Baas, M., Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008). A meta-analysis of 25 years of 
mood-creativity research: Hedonic tone, activation, or regulatory focus? 
Psychological Bulletin, 779-806. doi:10.1037/a0012815  
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, B. W. G. (1996). Dispositional 
differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in 
need for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 197-253. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.119.2.197 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for 
cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. 
doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 
Cheng, C. Y., Leung, A., & Wu, T. Y. (2011). Going beyond the multicultural 
experience—creativity link: The mediating role of emotions. Journal of Social 
Issues, 67(4), 806-824. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2011.01729.x 
Crisp, R. J., & Turner, R. N. (2011). Cognitive adaptation to the experience of social 
and cultural diversity. Psychological Bulletin, 137(2), 242-266. 
doi:10.1037/a0021840 
Evans, J. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 255-278. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
27 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical 
sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 175-191. 
doi:10.3758/bf03193146 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE 
model as an integrative framework. Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 23, 75-109. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60318-4  
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from 
category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and 
motivation on attention and interpretation. Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 23, 1-74. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60317-2 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic 
perspectives, 19(4), 25-42. doi:10.2307/4134953 
Fried, E. I. (2017). What are psychological constructs? On the nature and statistical 
modelling of emotions, intelligence, personality traits and mental disorders. 
Health psychology review, 11(2), 130-134. 
doi:10.1080/17437199.2017.1306718 
Fritz, M. S., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2007). Required sample size to detect the mediated 
effect. Psychological Science, 18(3), 233-239. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01882.x 
Gocłowska, M. A., Baas, M., Crisp, R. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Whether social 
schema violations help or hurt creativity depends on need for structure. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(8), 1-13. 
doi:10.1177/0146167214533132 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
28 
Gocłowska, M. A., & Crisp, R. J. (2013). On counter-stereotypes and creative 
cognition: When interventions for reducing prejudice can boost divergent 
thinking. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 8, 72-79. 
doi:10.1016/j.tsc.2012.07.001 
Gocłowska, M. A., Crisp, R. J., & Labuschagne, K. (2012). Can counter-stereotypes 
boost flexible thinking? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16(2), 217-
231. doi:10.1177/1368430212445076 
Gocłowska, M. A., Damian, R. I., & Mor, S. (2017). The Diversifying Experience 
Model: Taking a broader conceptual view of the multiculturalism–creativity 
link. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. doi:10.1177/0022022116650258 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the 
Big-Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 
504528. doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1 
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & 
Mellott, D. S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-
esteem, and self-concept. Psychological Review, 109(1), 3-25. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.109.1.3 
Hutter, R. R. C., & Crisp, R. J. (2005). The composition of category conjunctions. 
Personality & social psychology bulletin, 31(5), 647-657. 
doi:10.1177/0146167204271575 
Hutter, R. R. C., & Crisp, R. J. (2006). Implications of cognitive busyness for the 
perception of category conjunctions. The Journal of social psychology, 146(2), 
253-256. doi:10.3200/SOCP.146.2.253-256 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
29 
Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., & Nowicki, G. P. (1987). Positive affect facilitates 
creative problem solving. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(6), 
1122-1131. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1122 
Kashdan, T. B., Gallagher, M. W., Silvia, P. J., Winterstein, B. P., Breen, W. E., 
Terhar, D., & Steger, M. F. (2009). The curiosity and exploration inventory-II: 
Development, factor structure, and psychometrics. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 43(6), 987-998. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.04.011 
Leone, C., Wallace, H. M. & Modglin, K. (1999). The need for closure and the need 
for structure: Interrelationships, correlates, and outcomes. Journal of 
Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 133(5), 553–562. doi:10 . 1080 / 
00223989909599762 
Leung, A., & Chiu, C.-y. (2008). Interactive effects of multicultural experiences and 
openness to experience on creative potential. Creativity Research Journal, 
20(4), 376-382. doi:10.1080/10400410802391371 
Litman, J. A., & Spielberger, C. D. (2003). Measuring epistemic curiosity and its 
diversive and specific components. Journal of Personality Assessment, 80(1), 
75-86. doi:10.1207/S15327752JPA8001_16 
Mayer, J. D., & Gaschke, Y. N. (1988). The experience and meta-experience of mood. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(1), 102-111.  
Mirisola, A., & Seta, L. (2016). pequod: Moderated regression package. R package 
version 0.0-4. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=pequod.  
Mussel, P. (2010). Epistemic curiosity and related constructs: Lacking evidence of 
discriminant validity. Personality and Individual Differences, 49(5), 506-510. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.014 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
30 
Nair, K. U., & Ramnarayan, S. (2000). Individual Differences in Need for Cognition 
and Complex Problem Solving. Journal of Research in Personality, 34(3), 305-
328. doi:10.1006/jrpe.1999.2274 
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual 
differences in the desire for simpler structure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 65(1), 113-131. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.1.113 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation 
checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 867-872. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009 
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017). Beyond the Turk: 
Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 70, 153-163. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.01.006 
Peltier, J. W., & Schibrowsky, J. A. (1994). Need for cognition, advertisement viewing 
time and memory for advertising stimuli. In C. T. Allen & D. Roedder John 
(Eds.), NA-Advances in Consumer Research Volume 21 (Vol. 21, pp. 244-250). 
Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research. 
Plaks, J. E., Stroessner, S. J., Dweck, C. S. & Sherman, J. W. (2001). Person theories 
and attention allocation: Preferences for stereotypic versus counterstereotypic 
information. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 80(6), 876–893. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.876 
Prati, F., Crisp, R. J., & Rubini, M. (2015). Counter-stereotypes reduce emotional 
intergroup bias by eliciting surprise in the face of unexpected category 
combinations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 61, 31-43. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.06.004 
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
31 
Prati, F., Vasiljevic, M., Crisp, R. J., & Rubini, M. (2015). Some extended 
psychological benefits of challenging social stereotypes: Decreased 
dehumanization and a reduced reliance on heuristic thinking. Group Processes 
& Intergroup Relations, 18(6), 801-816. doi:10.1177/1368430214567762 
Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 48(2).  
Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & Mossman, A. (2007). The nature of awe: Elicitors, 
appraisals, and effects on self-concept. Cognition & Emotion, 21(5), 944-963. 
doi:10.1080/02699930600923668 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3), 220-247. 
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1 
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Assessing miserly information 
processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking & 
Reasoning, 20(2), 147-168. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.844729 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. Science (New York, N.Y.), 185(4157), 1124-1131. 
doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
Vasiljevic, M. & Crisp, R. J. (2013). Tolerance by surprise: Evidence for a generalized 
reduction in prejudice and increased egalitarianism through novel category 
combination. PLoS ONE, 8(3), 1–9. doi:https ://doi .org/10.1371/journal . 
pone.0057106 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 36(3), 1-48.  
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
32 
von Stumm, S., Hell, B., & Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2011). The hungry mind: 
Intellectual curiosity is the third pillar of academic performance. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 6(6), 574-588. doi:10.1177/1745691611421204 
  
Diversity May Help the Uninterested 
 
33 
Figures 
Figure 1.  
Cognitive reflection as a function of exposure to CSTs at different levels of NFC 
(Experiment 1).  
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Figure 2.  
Cognitive reflection as a function of exposure to CSTs at different levels of NFC 
(Experiment 2). 
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Figure 3.  
Cognitive reflection as a function of exposure to CSTs at different levels of NFC 
(Experiment 3). 
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